A Configurational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance

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**Abstract**

We seek to bring to the core of the study of comparative corporate governance analysis the idea that within countries and industries, there exist multiple configurations of firm level characteristics and governance practices leading to effective corporate governance. In particular, we propose that configurations composed of different bundles of corporate governance practices are a useful tool to examine corporate governance models across and within countries (as well as potentially to analyze over time changes). While comparative research, identifying stylized national models of corporate governance, has been fruitful to help us think about the key institutional and shareholder rights determining governance differences and similarities across countries, we believe that given the financialization of the corporate economy, current globalization trends of investment, and rapid information technology advances, it is important to shift our conceptualization of governance models beyond the dichotomous world of common−law/outside/shareholder−oriented system vs. civil law/insider/stakeholder oriented system. Our claim is based on the empirical observation that there exists a wide range of firms that either (1) fall in the “wrong” corporate governance category; (2) are a hybrid of these two categories; or (3) should be placed into an entirely new category such as firms in emerging markets or state−owned firms. In addition, as Aguilera and Jackson (2003) argue, firms, regardless of their legal family constraints, their labor and product markets, and the development of the financial markets from which they can draw, have significant degrees of freedom to chose whether to implement different levels of a given corporate governance practice. That is, firms might chose to fully endorse a practice or simply seek to comply with the minimum requirements without truly internalizing the governance practice. An illustrative example of the different degrees of internalization of governance practices is the existing variation in firms’ definition of director independence or disclosure of compensation systems. We first discuss the conceptual idea of configurations or bundles of corporate governance practices underscoring the concept of equifinal paths to given firm outcomes as well as the complementarity and substitution in governance practices. We then move to the practice level of analysis to show how three governance characteristics (legal systems, ownership and boards of directors) cannot be conceptualized independently, as each of them is contingent on the strength and prevalence of other governance practices. In
the last section, we illustrate how different configurations are likely to playout across industries and countries, taking as the departing practice, corporate ownership.
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1. INTRODUCTION

In this book chapter, we seek to bring to the core of the study of comparative corporate governance analysis the idea that within countries and industries, there exist multiple configurations of firm level characteristics and governance practices leading to effective corporate governance. In particular, we propose that configurations composed of different bundles of corporate governance practices are a useful tool to examine corporate governance models across and within countries (as well as potentially to analyze over time changes). While comparative research, identifying stylized national models of corporate governance, has been fruitful to help us think about the key institutional and shareholder rights determining governance differences and similarities across countries, we believe that given the financialization of the corporate economy, current globalization trends of investment, and rapid information technology advances, it is important to shift our conceptualization of governance models beyond the dichotomous world of common-law/outsider/shareholder-oriented system vs. civil law/insider/stakeholder oriented system. Our claim is based on the empirical observation that there exists a wide range of firms that either (1) fall in the “wrong” corporate governance category; (2) are a hybrid of these two categories; or (3) should be placed into an entirely new category such as firms in emerging markets or state-owned firms. For example, we have firms listed in the NYSE such as Nordstrom which has a majority owner (Nordstrom family) and firms in the traditional Continental model such as Telefónica in Spain which has dispersed ownership. This is the opposite of what the insider/outsider models would predict. To push the example further, there are firms in Japan which are concentrated such as NTT DoMoCo, Hitachi and Nissan and others which are dispersed such as Sanyo Electronics or NEC Corporation. In sum, it is difficult to continue to equate firm nationality with governance model.
In addition, as Aguilera and Jackson (2003) argue, firms, regardless of their legal family constraints, their labor and product markets, and the development of the financial markets from which they can draw, have significant degrees of freedom to choose whether to implement different levels of a given corporate governance practice. That is, firms might choose to fully endorse a practice or simply seek to comply with the minimum requirements without truly internalizing the governance practice. An illustrative example of the different degrees of internalization of governance practices is the existing variation in firms’ definition of director independence or disclosure of compensation systems.

In this chapter, we first discuss the conceptual idea of configurations or bundles of corporate governance practices underscoring the concept of equifinal paths to given firm outcomes as well as the complementarity and substitution in governance practices. We then move to the practice level of analysis to show how three governance characteristics (legal systems, ownership and boards of directors) cannot be conceptualized independently, as each of them is contingent on the strength and prevalence of other governance practices. In the last section, we illustrate how different configurations are likely to play out across industries and countries, taking as the departing practice, corporate ownership.

2. BUNDLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES

Corporate governance relates to the “structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a stake in the firm” (Aoki 2001). Effective corporate governance implies mechanisms to ensure executives respect the rights and interests of company stakeholders, as well as guarantee that stakeholders act responsibly with regard to the generation, protection, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm (Aguilera et al. 2008). The empirical literature on
corporate governance has been mostly rooted in agency theory, assuming that by managing the principal-agency problem between shareholders and managers, firms will operate more efficiently and perform better. This stream of research identifies situations in which shareholders’ and managers’ interests are likely to diverge and proposes mechanisms that can mitigate managers’ self-serving behavior (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), such as the board of directors, shareholder involvement, information disclosure, auditing, the market for corporate control, executive pay, and stakeholder involvement (Filatotchev et al. 2006). Despite the large body of research, the empirical findings on the link between governance practices and firm outcomes (e.g., firm performance) continues to be mixed and inconclusive (Dalton et al. 1998, Dalton et al. 2007).

Within this stream of work, the influence of board independence on firm performance has been of great interest (Dalton et al. 2007, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, Johnson et al., 1996). However, empirical research from an agency perspective is equivocal as neither Dalton et al.’s (1998) meta-analysis nor Dalton et al.’s (2007) literature review offer support for this relationship or agency prescriptions in general. Likewise, neither the joint nor separate board leadership structures have been found to universally enhance firm financial performance (Beatty and Zajac 1994, Dalton et al. 1998, Dalton et al. 2007) nor has support been found for the hypothesized relationship between share ownership by large blockholders and performance measures (Dalton et al. 2003). The ambiguity regarding empirical evidence also applies to other areas of corporate governance research (Filatotchev et al. 2006), such as executive pay (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) or the market for corporate control (Datta et al. 1992, King et al. 2004).

The weak interrelationships between ‘good’ corporate governance and firm performance cast doubt on several premises of agency research and suggest a need to re-orient corporate
governance research frameworks. Filatotchev (2008) argues that one reason for the mixed empirical results related to the effectiveness of various governance mechanisms may be the neglect of patterned variations in corporate governance contingent to the contexts of different organizational environments. Likewise, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) posit that the ‘under-contextualized’ approach of agency theory remains restricted to two actors (managers and shareholders) and abstracts away from other aspects of the organizational context that impact agency problems, such as diverse task environments, the life-cycle of organizations, or institutional context of corporate governance.

A growing literature has sought to develop a configurational approach to corporate governance by identifying distinct, internally consistent sets of firms and the relations to their environments, rather than one universal set of relationships that hold across all organizations and by exploring how corporate governance mechanisms interact and substitute or complement each other as related ‘bundles’ of practices. The theory of complementarity provides the basis to understand how various elements of strategy, structure and processes of an organization are interrelated (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Milgrom and Roberts 1995, Aoki 2001). The concept of complementarity offers a rigorous explanation to the synergistic effects among activities. Two activities are complementary when the adoption of one increases the marginal returns of the other and vice-versa (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006). This configurational logic is also fairly well-developed within the field of Human Resource Management (HRM), and in particular in efforts to predict what combinations of HRM practices lead to high work performance systems (Delery and Doty 1996, Huselid 1995, Lepak et al. 2006, MacDuffie 1995).

Within the context of strategic and governance research, Rediker and Seth (1995) introduced the concept of a “bundle of governance mechanisms” under the rubric of a cost–
benefit analysis. They propose that firm performance is dependent on the effectiveness of the bundle of governance mechanisms rather than the effectiveness of any one mechanism. Additionally, they argue that even though the overall bundle is effective in aligning manager-shareholder interests, the impact of any one mechanism may be insufficient to achieve such alignment. For example, the effectiveness of board independence is likely to increase in the presence of other corporate governance elements such as the existence of board committees, which structure and enhance the influence of independent directors within the board. Likewise, independent directors are argued to play an important role in setting executive pay and assuring appropriate incentive alignment between executives and shareholder interests. At a broader institutional level, the factual independence of directors is enhanced by the existence of comparatively strong legal protection of shareholder rights. In short, this approach helps explain why no one best way exists to achieve effective corporate governance. Rather, corporate governance arrangements are diverse and exhibit patterned variation across firms and their environments.

In general, when one mechanism acts as a substitute for another mechanism, this refers to the direct functional replacement of the first mechanism by the second. An increase in the second mechanism directly replaces a portion of the first mechanism while the overall functionality of the system remains constant. Rediker and Seth (1995) empirically examine the substitution effects between board monitoring, monitoring by outside shareholders and managerial incentive alignment. If managerial incentives are aligned with shareholder interests such that acting in the best interest of shareholders is also in the best interests of the managers, then the need for the board to monitor the actions of management on behalf of shareholders is reduced and the governance mechanisms are substitutable. Similarly, if board monitoring is comprehensive and
the board actively sanctions management when management is not acting in shareholder interests, then the alignment of managerial incentives to shareholder interests may be less necessary. Indeed, Zajac and Westphal (1994) find that the use of long-term incentive plans for CEOs are negatively related to the monitoring processes in place; firms that have stronger incentive alignment tended to have weaker monitoring mechanisms and vice versa. In this way, monitoring and incentive alignment act as substitutes for one another to provide a general level of governance effectiveness in controlling for agency issues. In addition, Desender et al. (2011) demonstrate that ownership concentration and board composition become substitutes when it comes to monitoring management. They uncover that while the board of directors complements its monitoring role through the higher use of external audit services when ownership is dispersed, this is not the case when ownership is concentrated.

However, Ward et al. (2009) propose that in some circumstances, instead of acting as substitutes, monitoring and incentive alignment may act as complements to one another, where the presence or addition of one mechanism strengthens the other and leads to more effective governance in addressing agency problems. For instance, Rutherford et al. (2007) empirically examine the complementarity of board monitoring and CEO incentive systems and find that CEO stock options complemented boards that monitor through frequent, formal meetings. Independent and active boards can also be functional in prohibiting managers from repricing stock options in the face of poor performance, or modifying performance targets or metrics that trigger incentive compensation. In this way, the addition of monitoring facilitates the improvement of incentive alignment, avoiding moral hazard issues, even when the incentive structure itself does not change.

In applying complementarities to corporate governance, various works have stressed that
the simultaneous operation of several corporate governance mechanisms are important in limiting managerial opportunism (Rediker and Seth 1995, Walsh and Seward 1990, Hoskisson et al. 2002). For example, Anglo-American or shareholder oriented corporate governance systems are based on broad interdependencies between performance incentives within executive remuneration, board independence, and the market for corporate control. These corporate governance mechanisms serve to align incentives within and outside the organization, and to make corporate governance more effective in environments of dispersed ownership. Yet, even these interdependent mechanisms of corporate governance would remain quite ineffective without further complementary mechanisms, such as high information disclosure to investors, which allows the market to price shares accurately, and a rigorous system of auditing to assure the quality of information disclosed (Aguilera et al. 2008).

Elements common in Anglo-American corporate governance systems often remain absent in other countries, where other corporate governance mechanisms may effectively substitute and display different sets of complementarities. Where one specific mechanism is used less, others may be used more, resulting in equally good performance (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Garcia-Castro et al. 2011). For example, in German and Japanese corporate governance, monitoring by relationship-oriented banks may effectively substitute for an active market for corporate control (Aoki 1994). Jensen (1986) also suggests that when the market for corporate control is less efficient, the governance effects of debt holders may play a particularly important role in restraining managerial discretion. The long-term nature of bank-firm relationships may also display critical complementarities with a more active role of stakeholders, such as employees, as employees’ investments in firm-specific capital are protected from ‘breaches of trust’ (Aoki 2001) and employee voice helps to make managers more accountable internally by more
thoroughly justifying and negotiating key strategic decisions (Streeck 1987).

The number of potential combinations of corporate governance practices, and hence their complementarities, is extensive. These configurations remain to be systematically theorized and investigated empirically. Moreover, a particular corporate governance mechanism, such as the market for corporate control or independent board members, may have opposite effects in different institutional contexts. Whereas the market for corporate control may help exert discipline in the context of dispersed ownership and high transparency, the same may undermine the effective participation of stakeholders. At the level of institutions, corporate governance practices embodying conflicting principles may also allow for more heterogeneous combinations of corporate governance characteristics and maintain requisite flexibility for future adaptation in a population of firms (Stark 2001).

Building on strategic governance and institutional analysis, a number of recent studies develop a conceptual framework for better understanding the influence of organization-environment interdependencies on the effectiveness of corporate governance in terms of firms’ contingencies, complementarities between governance practices and potential costs of corporate governance (e.g., Aguilera et al. 2008, Filatotchev et al. 2006).

This research proposes that effective corporate governance depends upon the alignment of interdependent organizational and environmental characteristics and helps to explain why, despite some universal principals, no ‘one best way’ exists. Rather, the notion of corporate governance as a system of interrelated firm elements having strategic or institutional complementarities suggests that particular practices will be effective only in certain combinations and furthermore they may grant different patterns of corporate governance (Aguilera et al. 2008; Garcia-Castro et al. 2011). This research sustains that corporate
governance recommendations and policymaking will be more effective if they take into 
explanation the potential diversity of governance mechanisms, which deal with important firm 
level contingencies.

In the next sections, we discuss how three different governance practices - legal 
pressures, ownership structure and board practice - are defined in the context of other 
governance mechanisms.

3. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

Inevitably, corporate law and regulation in every country deal with different kinds of 
corporate governance challenges starting from the classic potential conflict of interests between 
the managers and shareholders, extending to the opportunism of controlling shareholders against 
minority shareholders, to the tensions between shareholders and managers with other corporate 
constituents such as employees or debt-holders (Aguilera and Jackson 2003, Davies et al. 2004). 
In this regard, rather than addressing actor-actor conflicts in isolation, different configurations of 
bundles of corporate governance mechanisms explore the interactions among the multiple firm 
actors (i.e., shareholders, managers, employees, state, suppliers, etc.), their respective interests 
and constraints, and the associated legal tradeoffs to become effective members of the intra-firm 
relationships. In this section, we first discuss how different legal jurisdictions impose a diverse 
sort of constraints (or enablers) to reduce (or to enhance) the opportunism among the multiple 
constituencies of the firm. Second, we comment on the emerging issue of new governance or the 
existing debate between soft law and hard law.

Legal Strategies and Legal Families

10
The baseline regulatory paradigm constraints corporate actors by requiring them not to take particular actions, or engage in transactions, that could harm the interests of other stakeholders. Lawmakers can establish such constraints as *rules* (*i.e.*, *laws*), which relates to prohibiting some kind of behavior, *ex ante*, or *standards* (*i.e.*, *soft law*), which leaves the compliance determination to the courts, *ex post* (*i.e.*, *jurisprudence*) (Kraakman et al. 2004). In most countries, corporate governance practices fall in the domain of mandatory corporate and stock exchange law, as well as a set of self-regulation initiatives (*standards*) such as codes of corporate governance, *standards* (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009, Hopt 2011).

In general, the rule strategy is more common in Continental Europe while in the United States and the United Kingdom jurisprudence is preferred to rules. Kraakman et al. (2008) propose two main hypotheses to explain this sharp division. First, they draw on the traditional legal origin dichotomy between common and civil law. In civil law countries such as France or Spain, judges follow and enforce strict and clearly defined rules. Second, the implementation of *rule* strategies in corporate governance has its roots on capital markets history.

However, when it turns to corporate governance regulation, influenced by the U.K., there is a convergence towards the use of codes of corporate governance in continental European countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004, 2009, Kabbach-Castro and Crespi-Cladera 2011). In fact, on February 22, 2006, the European Union Corporate Governance Forum strongly endorsed the view that national corporate governance codes should be implemented under the “comply-or-explain” principle as proposed by the U.K. Cadbury’s Report (IFC 2008).

The law and finance literature focuses on the importance of law (*i.e.*, rules and standards) and its enforcement to protect the property rights, particularly, minority shareholder rights (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 1998). The main argument is that the protection of
investors’ rights, which is granted by the origin of the legal system (civil or common law), is a central determinant of investor willingness to finance firms (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). It follows that, in countries with strong shareholder protection, investors are more willing to take minority positions rather than controlling the firm. On the contrary, where shareholder rights are not well protected, investors will compensate for this deficiency by taking controlling positions in a firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Then, the supply of finance through minority shareholders is constrained by the extent of their protection under the law or other kind of financial regulation (Milhaupt and Pistor 2008). And, ultimately, it is argued that the quality of property rights’ protection determines economic outcomes in those countries. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) claim that a 1.6-point increase in the shareholder rights measure, roughly the distance between the American common-law legal origin and French civil law averages, reduces ownership concentration by five percent points.

La Porta et al. (1998), and subsequent work, has placed research on legal families at the core of the corporate governance discussion. These studies have had a large impact on public policy and scholarship and have also triggered an extensive debate on the role of law in corporate governance (Aguilera and Jackson 2010). However, scholars are critical of their core arguments (Aguilera and Williams 2009). In part, because their assumptions are believed to be too narrow and do not hold for recently important economic success stories such as China—where its remarkable economic growth is not tied to the common law system as an “ideal rule-of-law” (Milhaupt and Pistor 2008). In fact, recent studies (Gilson 2006, 2007) have raised doubts about

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1 La Porta et al. (1998) focus on four legal origin families, English Common law, French Civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian civil law. On the other hand, Zweigert and Kotz (1998) distinguish among five legal families, namely Romanistic (France), Germanic (Germany and Switzerland), Anglo-American (United States and United Kingdom), Nordic, and East Asia (Japan and China).
the overwhelming focus on controlling shareholders as value destroying actors in concentrated ownership systems of corporate governance. The argument is that some private benefits of control are necessary for inducing the controlling shareholder to exercise a monitoring function. The need to secure activism from the controlling shareholder is made particularly crucial in countries with both ineffective corporate law and weak commercial law.

In the same logic, Roe (2002, 271) concludes, “[The] quality of a country corporate law cannot be the only explanation for why diffuse Berle and Means (1932) firms grow and dominate. Perhaps, for some countries at some times, it is not even the principal one.” He argues that corporate law protective of minority shareholders cannot cover every instance of destruction of shareholder value. Even in the best-case scenario, i.e. the U.K. and the U.S., the system of corporate law protects minority shareholders well against breach of fiduciary duties, lying, stealing (i.e., dishonest behavior). Yet, even the Anglo-American system does not protect minority shareholder against managerial mistakes (i.e., the business judgment rule). Shareholder value destruction can take place through managerial dishonest behavior.

The puzzle for Roe (2002) is that ownership is diffused in the U.S and the U.K. despite the fact that the law does not cover every instance of shareholder value destruction; hence some other mechanisms must be activated in order to account for this behavior, and Roe proposes that we need to take into account politics² (Roe 1994, 2000). In his view, for example, European social democracies pressure corporate managers to forego opportunities for profit maximization in order to maintain high employment. Therefore, concentrated ownership is a defensive reaction to these pressures. In a different way, in the U.S., legislators responded to a populist agenda in the 1930s and limited the power exercised by large financial conglomerates, reducing the

² We would like to thank Michael Goyer to point out this important dimension.
ownership concentration. Franks et al. (2009) offer further empirical evidence for Roe’s argument as they demonstrate that dispersed ownership emerged rapidly in the first half of the twentieth century in the U.K., even in the absence of strong investor protection.

More recently, novel research by Deakin and others (Armour et al. 2009, Deakin et al. 2007, Siems and Deakin 2010) sheds light into the unexplained issues of the influence of legal families on corporate governance practices and firm behavior. Siems and Deakin’s (2010, 17) main conclusion is that “legal rules are, to a significant degree, endogenous to the political economy context of the systems in which they operate.” Hence, there exist two main theories of corporate regulation. On the one hand, the public interest theory argues that a government pursuing social efficiency (i.e., social welfare) will respond to market failures by looking after the public interest through regulation (Djankov 2009). On the other hand, the public choice theory (Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976) claims that regulation is socially and economically inefficient, favoring bureaucrats to social welfare. An illustrative example is Djankov et al.’s (2002) study of entry regulation across countries. They find evidence that less democratic countries are heavily regulated, and such regulation does not yield visible social benefits, supporting the public choice theory that emphasizes rent extraction by politicians.

In sum, to understand the relationship between legal differences and the patterns of bundles of corporate governance practices, we have to consider not only the legal origin of a particular environment, but also, political forces shaping the corporate agenda, capital markets history, and corporate law differences as an integrated framework. In this regard, one emerging debate in the comparative law and governance literature concerns the effectiveness of soft law (i.e., standards) versus hard law (i.e., rules), which still needs to be answered.

Hard Law versus Soft Law
Since the turn of the century, corporate governance in the form of soft law in various forms has gained ground (Aguilera and Jackson 2010, Hopt 2011). Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) argue that corporate governance codes are designed to address deficiencies in corporate governance systems by recommending comprehensive set of norms on good practice to firms in regulatory environments, which are hard to change. The content of many of these codes stipulates guiding principles on board composition, ownership structure, and executive compensation schemes (Kabbach-Castro and Crespi-Cladera 2011). And, in fact, most of advanced and emerging economies have relied on codes of good governance based on the “comply or explain” principle as an expediting mechanism to update their corporate regulation, given their often-outdated and rigid legal system.

It is interesting to observe, for example, how the United States continues to develop hard law such as the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act to improve governance accountability and transparency, whereas most of the other advanced industrialized countries continue to rely mostly on voluntary codes of good governance (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009, Aguilera and Jackson 2010). Hopt (2011) claims that this dichotomy between hard law and soft law might be explained as a positive byproduct of scandals, when policy makers can see where regulation has lacunae or is not effective. However, he continues, scandal- or crisis-driven regulation often becomes too strict. For example, in Germany, instead of giving the corporate governance code commission time to revise its recommendations on directors’ remuneration, in 2009, the German Parliament reacted with a mandatory reform law on this issue (Aguilera and Jackson 2010, Hopt 2011).

In sum, we reach the conclusion that there is not an optimum regulation level, neither a “one size fits all” magical bundle of corporate governance practices that cope with different
firm’s realities and their industry and countries contingencies. In addition, we suggest two policy implications. First, a balance between rules (i.e., hard law) and standards (i.e., soft law) is context dependent and policymakers have to behave accordingly in order to avoid the risk to overthrow well-established culture, values and governance practices to new norms that not necessarily resolve immediate crisis or corporate scandals. Second, corporate governance codes introduce flexibility to the corporate governance system allowing firms and corporate stakeholders to adapt governance’s practices to their contingencies; yet a clear enforcement mechanism should be in place to guarantee the desired outcomes. Finally, it seems inevitable that we are moving towards a new territory of global governance where regulation is implemented at the industry level and enforced at a transnational level (Aguilera 2011).

4. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

One important component of the corporate governance bundle is the ownership structure of the firm. Differences in ownership structure have two obvious consequences for corporate governance, as surveyed in Morck et al. (2005). On the one hand, dominant shareholders possess both the incentive and the power to discipline management. On the other hand, concentrated ownership can create conditions for a new problem (agency type II), because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders are not aligned and the controlling shareholders could expropriate the minority shareholders. Connelly et al.’s (2010) review suggests that shareholders with significant ownership have both incentives to monitor executives and the influence to promote strategies they feel will be beneficial.

The ownership structure is quite diverse across countries, with dispersed ownership being much more frequent in U.S. and U.K. listed firms, compared to Continental Europe, where
concentrated ownership is prevalent (La Porta et al. 1999). Faccio and Lang (2002) report in a study of 5232 publicly traded corporations in 13 Western European countries that only 36.93 percent could be considered firms with dispersed ownership. In many transition economies (emerging economies), family owners and other block-holders are an important governance constituency (Douma et al. 2006).

The nature of governance problems differs greatly between publicly traded companies with and without a controlling shareholder (La Porta et al. 1999, Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009). With controlling shareholders, the market for corporate control that plays such an important role in the analysis of companies without a controller cannot provide a source of discipline. With a controlling shareholder, the fundamental governance problem is not opportunism by executives and directors at the expense of public shareholders at large but rather opportunism by the controlling shareholder at the expense of the minority shareholders. Shareholder control is an internal governance mechanism, which can range from a sole majority owner to numerous small shareholders and are likely to influence other elements of the corporate governance bundle. For example, Desender et al. (2011) argue that there may be substitution/complementary effects between dimensions of the ownership structure (concentration/dispersion) and the board of directors in terms of monitoring management.

Several researchers, including Aguilera and Jackson (2003) and Adams et al. (2010), call for a distinction between types of controlling shareholders when studying ownership structure because different types of owners pursue different strategic objectives, and thus can be expected to exert different demands from boards and disciplinary effects on managers. We distinguish between family ownership, institutional ownership, and bank ownership.

Family control represents a distinctive class of investors in that they hold little diversified
Institutional investors are mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, and other non-banking organizations that invest their members’ capital in shares and bonds. The main goal of institutional investors is to maximize the financial gains from a portfolio of investments, which make them more concerned about maximizing shareholder value and
liquidity (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000, Aggarwal et al. 2010). To accomplish this goal and reduce the uncertainties of their investments, institutional investors usually have an arm’s-length relation with firms where rather than spending time and resources trying to improve the performance of a company in its portfolio, they simply sell the shares of the under-performing company and walk away (Ingley and Van der Walt 2004). The presence of institutional investors is likely to have influenced other elements of the corporate governance bundle. For example, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) report that Japanese firms were influenced by Anglo-American institutional investors to adopt business practices more consistent with the Anglo-American shareholder-based system.

Banks often have multiple ties with the firms in which they own shares and their equity stake primarily serves to cement an often-complex set of non-shareholder relationships with the firm (Roe 1994). Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1997) point out that banks possess private information on firms, either through the past repayment records of the bank’s existing borrowers or through the banks’ superior knowledge of local business conditions (Triantis and Daniels 1995). As shareholder with superior access to information and power to discipline management, it can be argued that banks are able to reduce the monitoring efforts needed, which may have an influence on other elements of the corporate governance bundle.

5. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Boards are by definition the internal governing mechanism that shapes firm governance, given their direct access to the two other axes in the corporate governance triangle: managers and shareholders. The board receives its authority from stockholders of corporations and its job is to hire, fire, compensate, and advise top management on behalf of those shareholders (Jensen,
20193) as well as monitor top management teams to assure they comply with the existing regulation. This delegation occurs because stockholders generally do not have a large enough incentive to devote resources to ensure that management is acting in the stockholders’ interest. It is the duty of the board of directors to manage the company’s affairs in the interests of the company and all its shareholders (fiduciary duty), within the framework of the laws, regulations and conventions under which the company operates. Boards are therefore an alternative to direct monitoring by shareholders (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Board members depend on the CEO to provide them with relevant firm-specific information. Therefore, the better the information the CEO provides, the better is the board’s advice but also the better the board can perform its monitoring role. In addition, boards typically delegate some of its duties to specific board committees such as audit, remuneration and nomination committees as additional monitoring controls.

Fama (1980) argues that the composition of the board of directors is important as it likely to influence the monitoring efforts of the board. Observers typically divide directors into two groups: inside directors and outside directors. Generally, a director who is a full-time employee of the firm in question is deemed to be an inside director, while a director whose primary employment is not with the firm is deemed to be an outside director. In recent years, public pressure and regulatory requirements have led firms to have majority-outsider boards and there is a lot more surveillance on what constitutes independence. The characteristics of boards of large U.S. corporations have been described in a number of studies. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find for a sample of 508 of the largest U.S. corporations that, on average, the board contains 12 board members, of which 55% are outsiders, and has 7.5 meetings a year. A number of the directors served on multiple boards (i.e., interlocking directorates); the outside directors in
these firms averaged over three directorships. Linck et al. (2008) present similar findings for a larger sample of 8000 smaller firms.

Since 2002, there have been significant changes. Sarbanes-Oxley contained a number of requirements that increased the workload of and the demand for outside directors (see Linck et al. (2008) for a description of these requirements). In addition, the scandals at Enron and WorldCom have led to substantially increased public scrutiny of corporate governance, accountability and disclosure. Consequently, boards have become larger, more independent, have more committees, meet more often, and generally have more responsibility and risk (Linck et al., 2008). These changes both increased the demand for directors and decreased the willingness of directors to serve. As a consequence, director pay and liability insurance premiums have increased substantially.

Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that the two main roles of the board are monitoring and advice. The monitoring role of the board is rooted in the agency theory where the primary concern of the board is to curb the self-serving behaviors of agents (the top management team) that may work against the best interests of the owners (shareholders) (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Eisenhardt 1989). Agency theory strongly favors outside directors, those detached from management and daily operations, as they facilitate objectivity (Kosnik 1987), while separate CEO and chair positions provide further checks and balances (Rechner and Dalton 1991). Several theoretical papers in the finance literature examine why boards may not monitor too intensively. Warther (1998) shows how the management’s power to eject board members may result in a passive board. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) use a manager’s power over the board selection process to show how board composition is a function of the board’s monitoring intensity. However, Almazan and Suarez (2003) argue that passive (or weak) boards
may be optimal because, in their framework, severance pay and weak boards are substitutes for costly incentive compensation. Empirically, the evidence with respect to the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance has been mixed (e.g. Dalton et al. 1998, Dalton et al. 2007).

The advisory role is rooted in the resource dependence (Boyd 1990, Daily and Dalton 1994, Gales and Kesner 1994, Hillman et al. 2000, Pfeffer 1972, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and stakeholder traditions (Hillman et al. 2001, Johnson and Greening 1999, Luoma and Goodstein 1999) and suggests that boards should take a role that centers on advising management and enhancing strategy formulation. The resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) argues that corporate boards are a mechanism for managing external dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), reducing environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer 1972) and reducing the transaction costs associated with environmental interdependency (Williamson 1984) and ultimately aid in the survival of the firm (Singh et al. 1986). Furthermore, insiders on the board are viewed as important contributors as they are knowledgeable about firm operations. Empirical studies in the resource dependence tradition have shown a positive relationship between board capital and board effectiveness (e.g., Boyd 1990, Dalton et al. 1999, Pfeffer 1972). Carpenter and Westphal (2001) found that boards consisting of directors with ties to strategically related organizations, for example, were able to provide better advice and counsel, which is positively related to firm performance (Westphal 1999). In addition, Hillman et al. (1999) found that when directors established connections to the U.S. government, shareholder value was positively affected. They conclude that such connections held the promise for information flow, more open communication and/or potential influence with the government, a critical source of uncertainty for many firms.
Boards are faced with an apparent paradox in that, on the one hand, they are expected to exercise control over the top management so that interests of shareholders (and other stakeholders) are protected; and on the other hand they need to work closely with the top management to provide valuable support in choosing corporate strategy and make informed decisions in implementing strategy (Hillman and Dalziel 2003, Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003). While there is a large literature that studies the monitoring role of boards, research on the advisory role, the interaction between the board’s two roles and the interaction between board roles and other elements of the corporate governance bundle has been scarce.

Desender et al. (2011) argue that the primary role of the board of directors is not independent from the context in which the company operates. The importance of the monitoring and advisory role is expected to be influenced by other elements of the corporate governance bundle, such as the legal protection of shareholders. For example, Adams (2005) find for a sample of Fortune 500 firms that, boards devote effort primarily to monitoring, rather than dealing with strategic issues or considering the interests of stakeholders. Other elements of the corporate governance bundle, such as the ownership structure or the executive compensation could also influence the importance of one role of the other. To illustrate, firms with controlling shareholders may benefit more from putting emphasis on the advisory role of the board compared to firms without controlling shareholders.

When ownership is diffuse, the monitoring role of the board is likely to be more important because it is difficult for the dispersed shareholders to co-ordinate their monitoring activities and is also not worthwhile for any individual investor to monitor the company on a continuing basis (Davies 2002, Aguilera 2005). To resolve the alignment problem in firms with dispersed ownership, the board may prioritize the monitoring role, as collectively all
shareholders benefit from the monitoring efforts by the board of directors. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders have strong incentives to monitor managers because of their significant economic stakes. Even when they cannot control the management themselves, large shareholders can facilitate third-party takeovers by splitting the large gains on their own shares with the bidder. Large shareholders might have access to private value-relevant information (Heflin and Shaw 2000), engage with management in setting corporate policy (Bhagat et al. 2004, Davies 2002, Denis and McConnell, 2003), have some ability to influence proxy voting and may also receive special attention from management (Useem 1996). Since blockholders have both, the incentives and the power to hold management accountable for actions that do not promote shareholder value (Bohinc and Bainbridge 2001), the monitoring role of the board, in such a situation, is considered to be less important (La Porta et al. 1998, Aguilera 2005, Desender et al. 2011).

6. SYSTEMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

corresponds to an ownership structure where few or even a single shareholder has the control of a firm, which is the case in most continental European countries (Barca and Becht 2001). On the other hand, the outsider system is characterized by the separation between ownership and control where ownership is dispersed amongst a large number of shareholders. Both the U.S. and the U.K. are examples of outsider system.


More recently, there have been efforts to more systematically account for these cross-national differences, resulting in a wide range of categorizations of corporate governance systems. We summarize what we believe are the current main four comparative corporate governance system categorizations. In Table 1, we outline the core governance characteristics indentified in the different corporate governance categorizations.

First, Weimer and Pape (1999), starting from the observation that the debate on corporate governance in an international setting is restricted by the lack of a clear framework, propose a
revised taxonomy of corporate governance systems. They based their analysis upon eight firm characteristics: (1) the concept of the firm, (2) the system of the board of directors, (3) the main stakeholders that exert control on managerial decisions, (4) the development of the capital market, (5) the role of the market for corporate control, (6) the corporate ownership structure, (7) the executive compensation system, and finally (8) the time perspective of economic relationships. And, to allow for an international comparison of these attributes, they divide countries into “market-oriented” systems (the Anglo-American system) and “network-oriented” systems. Then, the later is composed of Germanic countries (e.g., Germany and the Netherlands), in Latin countries (e.g., France and Italy), and Japan. After discussing the diverse characteristics across geographic regions, Weimwe and Pape conclude that the central attribute to the market-oriented systems is the market for corporate control, which serves as an external mechanism for shareholders to influence managerial decision. In the opposite side, in the network-oriented systems, oligarchic groups with different identities substantially manipulate managerial decision by direct modes of influence.

Second, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) draw on an “actor-centered” institutional approach to explain firm-level corporate governance practices in terms of institutional factors that shape how actors’ interests and conflicts are defined (“socially constructed”) and represented. In their model, they examine how labor, capital and management interact to explain firm’s governance patterns under diverse institutional settings. First, they use “forward-looking” propositions to analyze the isolated effects of each institutional domain on each stakeholder and illustrate this mechanism around three different conflicts: (1) class conflicts, (2) insider-outsider conflicts, and (3) accountability conflicts. And then, to explain cross-national variation on corporate
governance systems, they turn to “backward-looking” propositions that capture the cumulative and interdependent effects of different institutional domains within countries.

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Insert Table 1 about here

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Third, Millar et al. (2005), taking an international business orientation, classify three different systems: (a) the Anglo-Saxon (i.e., market-based system), (b) the Communitarian system, which includes continental European countries (i.e., stakeholder-based system), and (c) the Emerging Market system that comprises the East European countries, Asian countries such as China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines; and some of the Latin American countries such as Mexico, Chile, and Brazil. Taking into account the reality of the local, non-economic forces that influence firm capabilities and behaviors, they conclude that business systems have a strong influence on corporate governance practices, particularly, information disclosure and corporate transparency. They show that the institutional arrangements representative of a certain type of business system affects information disclosure, among which is the effectiveness of legal institutions that set boundaries between mandatory and voluntary information disclosure.

Finally, from the legal perspective, Gilson (2006: 1643) states that, “the familiar dichotomy is simply coarse as to be wrong.” He proposes to respond to its deficiencies by looking more closely at two central features of a more complex taxonomy: (1) the concepts of controlling shareholders, and (2) of private benefits of control. In the first place, Gilson defines two patterns of ownership concentration, inefficient and efficient controlling shareholders. Countries where “bad” law allows the cost of private benefit extractions to outweigh the benefits of monitoring are characterized as inefficient system. By contrary, the ownership pattern may
reflect a structure of efficient controlling shareholders, in which good law helps the benefits of more focused monitoring be greater than the costs of private benefit extraction. Secondly, he turns to the nature of the private benefits of control to distinguish between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits. The first is pecuniary private benefits of control; that is, the non-proportional flows of resources from the firm to the controlling shareholder. The second is non-pecuniary private benefits of control; that is, forms of emotional and other benefits that do not involve transfer of “real” resources. After characterizing the controlling shareholder taxonomy, Gilson discusses how prior distinct countries such as the United States and Sweden, can be similar in terms of “real” outcomes in protecting the minority shareholders and, ultimately, the financial investors. And he concludes that “to better understand the macroeconomic impact of efficient controlling shareholder systems, we need to better understand the micro-level dynamics of this ownership structure. As the focus of corporate governance scholarship shifts to controlling shareholder systems, we need to think small” (Gilson 2006, 1678).

7. DISCUSSION

The growing integration of financial markets is a key factor of convergence of corporate governance systems. Investors in most countries increasingly accept the proposition that holding an international equity portfolio leads to higher returns and lower risk than a purely domestic portfolio. As a result, many pension funds now allocate a certain portion of their portfolios to international equities while a large number of specialized mutual funds have been developed to allow individuals to participate in foreign equity investment. At the same time, non-financial companies realize that broadening the investor base will lower their cost of capital and may also lessen volatility in the price of the company’s stock.
The growing wish of both investors and issuers to operate in the international capital market requires some degree of acceptance of common values and standards. Institutional shareholders have brought with them expectations about shareholder value and are increasingly requiring firms to establish profit targets and to produce competitive returns on equity. Institutional investors also insist that companies respect international norms of governance, particularly concerning the fiduciary duties of management and obligation of controlling shareholders to respect demands of minority investors concerning transparency and the procedures for exercising corporate control, especially at the shareholders meeting. Thus, in addition to the legal and institutional changes, which are occurring in their home countries, companies are forced to adapt their behavior in order to be able to tap global capital markets.

Since the mid-1990s, there has been much talk of the convergence of corporate governance systems to Anglo-American standards, and several trends have pointed in this direction (e.g., Coffee 1999, 2002, Denis and McConnell 2003). However, Thomsen (2003) argues in favor of mutual convergence, i.e. that not only has European corporate governance converged to U.S. standards, but U.S. corporate governance has also effectively converged to European standards through the concentration of ownership and increasing levels of insider ownership (Holderness et al. 1998, Meyer 1998), the separation of management and control in more independent boards (Monks and Minnow 2001), the deregulation of the banking system (Financial Services Modernization Act 1999; The Economist 1999), and the increasing importance of stakeholder concerns (Agle et al. 1999, Jones and Wicks 1999, Jawahar and Mclauglin 2001). These shifts indicate that it is increasingly more relevant to look at the configuration of governance practices at the firm level.

Moreover, the fact that there are firms that fit within the different corporate governance
models within countries is indicative of the current hybrid trends away from stylized arrangements. An illustrative case is the rapidly changing configurations in emerging markets as they get strong influences from abroad. The case of Brazilian Stock Exchange (BSE) segmented listing is worth discussing. The Brazilian capital market faced a dramatic decrease in the number of listed firms and the trade volume during the last decade of twentieth century, going from 551 firms in 1996 to 428 firms in 2001, and from 112 billion to 65 billion dollars over the same time period (WDI, 2011). In December 2000, the Brazilian Stock Exchange – BM&FBovespa – issued new listing rules, the “Novo Mercado.” The aim of this regulation was to increase investors’ confidence in the BSE Market and to raise the level of management and majority shareholders’ accountability through good corporate governance practices and greater transparency, and, as a consequence, to reduce the cost of capital. The Novo Mercado listing rules establish that public share offerings have to use mechanisms to favor capital dispersion and broader retail access such as the “one-share-one-vote” principle. Additionally, among other requirements, firms have to maintain a minimum free float, equivalent to 25% of the capital, to disclose financial information according to the U.S. GAAP or IFRS accounting standards, and to have at least 5 members in the board of directors and 20% of independent directors\(^3\). These governance requirements are indeed very much in line with NYSE requirements.

The interesting dimension of the BSE Market regulation is that recognizing that some existing listed firms would find it difficult to adopt the new rules, which were quite restrictive compared to the traditional market rules and the corporate law, the BM&FBovespa proposed two differentiated levels of corporate governance practices, level 1 and level 2 (Carvalho, 2003). Altogether, there were four listing types: (1) traditional market, (2) level 1, (3) level 2, and (4)\(^3\) For additional details see, http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/
Novo Mercado. In March 2011, BM&FBovespa has 422 listed firms, of which 17 are on the level 2 trading list, 38 on the level 1 trading list, and 117 in the Novo Mercado; and the remaining 250 in the traditional market. This is very interesting because within a given stock market there are several degrees of compliance with governance rules which in a way equate to different models of corporate governance within a given country. The Brazilian example also supports the argument that firms do have choices within a given legal jurisdiction and a given country to adopt certain practices over others.

In sum, assembling corporate governance practices into bundles according to country institutional characteristics needs to be re-considered given the increase of the heterogeneity of corporate governance practices adopted by firms within countries as a result of internationalization and information advances. Therefore, we believe the discussion of corporate governance bundles is more fruitful at the firm level than at the country level and comparative corporate governance research may want to explore the heterogeneity of bundles within countries in addition to comparing across countries. Some scholars are currently developing empirical papers using set-theoretic methods (QCA/Fuzzy sets) to uncover different configurations of corporate governance practices across countries leading to high firm performance (García-Castro et al. 2011, Misangyi and Holehonur 2010) or to high IPO performance (Bell et al. 2010).

In the next and final section, we exemplify how different configurations of corporate governance practices could play out across countries, taking as the departing practice, corporate ownership. We distinguish between family ownership, bank ownership, institutional ownership, state ownership and firms with dispersed ownership.

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4 In addition to these four categories of corporate governance practices, the BM&FBovespa also includes a corporate governance differentiation for the over-the-counter market where only those publicly traded companies duly registered with CVM (Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil) can be listed, called BovespaMais.
a) Family ownership

Family control represents a distinctive class of investors in that they hold little diversified portfolios, are long-term investors, and often hold senior management positions, which places them in a unique position to influence and monitor the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Obviously, the higher the stake in the firm, the higher the alignment between the family owners and other shareholders will be. In an extreme case scenario, where the family owners are also actively involved in management and have an ownership stake above 50% (examples include Oracle Corp., Reebok Int. Ltd in the U.S. market, BMW and Inditex in Continental Europe or Samsung Group in Korea), the role of the board of directors is unlikely to strongly focus on monitoring. Second, the executive compensation package often intended to enforce alignment is of little relevance if managers hold an important stake of their wealth in the company. Third, disclosure is likely to be lower for family controlled firms, as a consequence of their lower need for financing through the capital market. Finally, other elements of the corporate governance bundle are also likely to be influenced by the presence of family owners. While family firms are typically more associated with the insider system, for the U.S., Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that one-third of S&P 500 firms can be classified as family-controlled firms. We believe that corporate governance dynamics for family controlled firms are likely to be similar, independent of the country in which they are incorporated. Perhaps, the better protection of minority shareholders allows family firms to rely more on the capital market for financing than on bank debt in countries with strong legal shareholder protection, however, banks could perform an important monitoring role to reduce expropriation risks in countries where shareholders are less protected and firms rely for external financing on bank debt. Therefore, we argue that, on average, family firms at least across the advanced industrialized and emerging market world are
likely to rely on a similar corporate governance bundles.

b) Bank ownership

Studies on comparative corporate governance have associated insider systems of corporate governance with a high dependence of firms upon banks and high debt/equity ratios. Instead of arm’s length lenders, banks tend to have more complex and longer term relationships with corporate clients. Examples of firms controlled by banks include Compagnie des Alpes in France, Banesto in Spain and NEC in Japan. Firms with a strong bank relationship often rely on confidentiality as information is shared between the bank and its corporate clients. In addition to holding considerable equity portfolios themselves, banks name representatives to the company boards and are seen as exercising a leadership role in non-financial companies or among groups of companies. Banks are often seen as representing all shareholders: their power extends beyond direct share ownership, as they hold and vote shares for individual investors. As a shareholder with superior access to information and power to discipline management, banks are likely to influence the priorities of the board of directors, other monitoring mechanisms and the design of executive incentives plans. Insider knowledge of the business allows the banks to serve a critical monitoring function, at a lower cost than what would be possible for other shareholders. In addition, as an important provider of financing to the firm, the bank is likely to offer much stronger incentives to executives in order to promote long term profit maximization. Therefore, bank ownership affects the corporate governance bundle in a number of ways. First, we believe that the role of the board is likely to be less focused on monitoring and more focused on the provision of resources. Second, bank’s high monitoring is likely to reduce the importance of executive incentives to achieve alignment of their interests. Third, disclosure to outside investors
is typically linked to the need of external financing. In this sense, firms with a strong bank relationship are more likely to depend less on financing through the stock market and have lower disclosure needs. Other elements of the corporate governance bundle, such as the reliance on market for corporate control or importance of external auditing are also likely to be influenced by the presence of a bank as controlling shareholder.

c) Institutional ownership

The main goal of institutional investors is to maximize the financial gains from a portfolio of investments, which make them more concerned about maximizing shareholder value and liquidity (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000, Aggarwal et al. 2010). Examples of firms controlled by institutional owners include Kaufman & broad and Rexel in France and Vedanta Resources in the United Kingdom. Prior research finds that a small number of institutional investors take an active role in the governance of their portfolio firms by waging public and private campaigns, sponsoring shareholder proposals, and voting against management attempts to entrench (Gillan and Starks 2003). For example, the mutual fund industry is generally far less committed to activism than the pension fund industry. This partly reflects the fact that the mutual funds must differentiate their products by applying their skills in assembling portfolios that are different from those of competitors and must demonstrate their portfolio management skills; they thus do not emulate but try to beat indexes. On balance, this sector is more likely to continue to pursue “buy and sell strategies.” To accomplish this goal and reduce the uncertainties of their investments, institutional investors usually have an arm’s-length relation with firms—where rather than spending time and resources trying to improve the performance of a company in its portfolio, they sell the shares of the under-performing company and walk away (Ingley and Van
der Walt 2004). Bushee et al. (2008) find that large, low-turnover institutions with preferences for growth and small-cap firms tend to prefer firms with existing preferred governance mechanisms and that these institutions are associated with future improvements in shareholder rights.

The degree of the involvement of institutional owners is likely to affect the corporate governance bundle. Improvements in disclosure, board independence and a focus of executive compensation on long term value creation are more likely in firms with high levels of institutional investors’ involvements. Besides, institutional investors have both the incentives and ability to operate as an effective monitor and they have acquired important experience regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance by their presence in other firms. The extent to which they may pursue direct monitoring instead of monitoring by the board or alignment through incentives is likely to depend on their total investment portfolio and limitations in terms of personnel. Institutional investors following a short-term investment strategy are much less likely to operate as active monitor, nor to instigate significant changes in the corporate governance dynamics of the firms in which they invest.

d) State ownership

In several countries, state ownership is a salient feature in some industries. State companies have received less attention in the international corporate governance debate. Examples of state owned firms include NTT in Japan, Électricité de France in France, PetroChina in China and Lloyds Banking Group in the United Kingdom. The state is generally said to be a passive owner, with a general tendency to be an owner with a long-term perspective, emphasizing value creation over time. A common argument in favor of state ownership is that there is a need to secure social
welfare and protect certain national strategic sectors, and that such welfare and strategic concerns may not be addressed by firms which are run according to the principle of profit-maximization. The alleged weaknesses of state companies are explained by their deviation from the principle that the control of a company should be vested in the hands of its owners. While, in theory, the taxpaying public owns state companies, they are controlled by bureaucrats. Hence the companies are run according to the goals of bureaucrats, which in Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) opinion are neither social welfare nor maximizing profits. Bureaucrats are first of all inclined to pursue their own political interests, such as securing votes by catering for the interests of special interest groups such as public employee trade unions. Several challenges relate to how state ownership should be organized and administered, as it needs to balance political and economic goals, on the one hand, and the State’s parallel functions as owner and regulator, on the other hand.

In terms of corporate governance, state ownership is more likely to strongly focus on a stakeholder approach to corporate governance than a shareholder approach. In terms of the board composition, this means the inclusion of politicians and employee representatives. This is likely to reduce the monitoring role of the board and to enforce their advisory role. Furthermore, state owned firms are likely to have other objectives beyond financial performance, such as long term growth, which are likely to influence the sensitivity of the executive compensation to financial performance. In addition, disclosure is unlikely to be higher than in firms without state ownership, given their access to private information and reduced need to rely on the capital market. Finally, the risk of hostile take-overs is minimal, as it depends on the willingness of the controlling owner to sell.

e) Ownership dispersion
Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that the free rider problem makes it cost ineffective for small shareholders to act as monitors of management. Firms without controlling owners therefore are more likely to assign a strong monitoring role to the board of directors, emphasizing board independence. Examples include Japan Airways and Honda in Japan, BAE System and British American Tobacco in the U.K. and Total and Air Liquide in France. In addition, executive compensation is another mechanism that could help reduce the possible divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. In terms of disclosure, one could expect firms with dispersed ownership to provide more information to its shareholders, as these firms tend to rely on the capital market for financing. Furthermore, the market for corporate control moderates the divergence of interests because shareholders acquiring control can discipline managers who fail to create shareholder value. This discipline can take the form of a takeover, closer shareholder monitoring, or dismissing management (Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Jensen 1988). To the extend that shareholder monitoring is less present when ownership is dispersed, or the board is dominated by management, reliance on the market for corporate takeover is going to be more important to align management interest with those of shareholders.

These five examples departing from the type of corporate ownership demonstrate that there is a wide range of combinations of corporate governance practices that firms can adopt which might be partly limited by the environment but are also constrained or enabled by the set of governance practices available. To conclude, we urge future research in comparative corporate governance to adopt a more holistic view of the firm-environment relationship and to examine the firm interdependencies among corporate governance practices. In other words, we encourage corporate governance scholars to move beyond the country level models of corporate
governance and study the degrees of freedom that firms have to embrace governance practices. Future research should also (1) study the increasing governance shifts towards a hybrid or mutual convergence system with multiple effective configurations of corporate governance practices, (2) explore existing industry pressures to comply or deviate towards certain practices, (3) expand the configurational framework to firms in emerging markets as these firms vary tremendously, and (4) rely on research methods that nicely capture this configurational approach. There is much exciting work to be done ahead of us!
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Table 1. Review of Country-Level Systems of Corporate Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Weimer &amp; Pape 1999</th>
<th>Market-oriented</th>
<th>Network-oriented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anglo-Saxon</td>
<td>Germanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>USA, UK, Canada, Australia</td>
<td>Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of the firm</td>
<td>Instrumental, shareholder-oriented</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of directors</td>
<td>One-tier</td>
<td>Two-tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main stakeholder</td>
<td>Shareholders</td>
<td>Industrial banks (Germany), employees, in general oligarchic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital markets</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate/ High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market for corporate control</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership concentration</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate/ High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive compensation, performance-dependent</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time horizon</td>
<td>Short term</td>
<td>Long term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>Anglo-Saxon</td>
<td>Communitarian</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA, UK, Canada</td>
<td>Continental European countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Shareholder rights | High | High | Low/Moderate | Low |
| Control function   | Market | Market/Governments | Governments | Governments |
| Main stakeholder    | Shareholders | Industrial banks (Germany), industrial firms, families, in general oligarchic group | Financial holdings, the government, families, in general oligarchic group | Financial holdings, the government, families, in general oligarchic group |
| Capital markets    | High | Moderate/High | Low/Moderate | Low |
| Market for corporate control | Active | Inactive | Inactive | Inactive |
| Ownership concentration | Low | Moderate/High | High | High |
| Time horizon       | Short term | Long term | Long term | Long term |
| Institution transaperecy | High | High | Low/Moderate | Low |
### Panel C: Gilson 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Efficient Controlling Shareholder System</th>
<th>Inefficient Controlling Shareholder System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countries</strong></td>
<td>USA, Sweden, Canada</td>
<td>Italy, Mexico, South East Asian countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership concentration</td>
<td>Low/ High</td>
<td>Moderate/ High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder rights</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of law</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management monitoring</td>
<td>Market/ Majority shareholders</td>
<td>Majority shareholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private benefits of control</td>
<td>Non-pecuniary</td>
<td>Pecuniary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital markets</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>Market for corporate control</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
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<td>Institution transaperecy</td>
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